zkLogin: Privacy-preserving blockchain authentication with existing credentials

Foteini Baldimitsi | Kostas Chalkias | Yan Ji | Jonas Lindstrøm | Deepak Maram | Ben Riva | <u>Mahdi Sedaghat</u> | Arnab Roy | Joy Wang

PostDoc at Cosic, KU Leuven Co-Founder at Soundness Labs (soundness.xyz)

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Mysten Labs and Sui:

Deployed on

zkLogin after ~1 year? One of the widely used zkApps to date

It has been used for over 7.6 million transactions. With around 2.4 million unique proofs (March 14).

Enoki




Sui (L1)


Walrus (DDA)


Move (Rust Smart Contract) Deepbook (DeFi)

There are around **100 million** active crypto wallets


and there are several **BILLIONS** of web2 accounts







METAMASK	M RETARA	< Back Confirm Please select each	ickup Phras		
No, I already have a seed					
Import wallet		network	uncle	frown	appear
		antenna	blush	section	orphan




	ME.	Signature Request		
METAMASK METAMASK	Back Cont Please set	Account: Balance: Test Acc 0 ETH Origin: @ https://opensea.io	other.	٢
		You are signing:	✓ S Polygon	~
No, I already have a seed Import your existing wallet using a 12 wa		This request will not trigger a blockchain transaction or cost any gas fees. Your authentication status will reset after 24	You receive	
Import wallet	anter	hours. Wallet address:	16.31 WETH 0.010002	≈ \$16.39
		0x88c78f158cac85f17ecfc063259543c5dc345ef3 Nonce: 196d8093-6b04-426d-9bde-2da1c5c09008	Verified on 4 sources. You can confirm the on PolygonScan.	te token address

Mnemonics and keys are not going to get us mass adoption.

Complexity is the killer of adoption. The ultimate killer dApp for blockchain, is accessibility.

Can we make it as easy as signing in with Google, Facebook and co?

- People don't want to use separate passwords for each and every app, each and every web2 service
- Extremely likely they already have a Google, Facebook, Amazon account
- Solution: use OAuth to leverage these already existing accounts




zkLogin: OAuth + Zero Knowledge Proof

Non-custodial User-friendly Privacy-preserving

OpenID Connect (an extension of OAuth 2.0)





A Google-issued JWT (decoded) Sign in with Google Header <u>"alg</u>" : "RS256" "kid" : "96971808796829a972e79a9d1a9fff11cd61b1e3", "typ": "JWT" 3 Payload Ł "iss": "https://accounts-google.com", "azp": "http://575519204237-msop9ep45u2u098hapqmngv8d84qdc8k-apps.googleusercontent.com", "aud": "http://575519204237-msop9ep45u2u098hapqmngv8d84qdc8k-apps.googleusercontent.com", · -> "sub": "1104634521", 1 "nonce": "iat": 1682002642, "exp": 1682002642, you can ask for email "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5d81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830", and other personal info "email": "test@soundness.xyz"


Inject a fresh public key into JWT!



We have a DIGITAL CERT over our fresh key + expiration



zkLogin tricks:



How to ensure users' privacy?

Blake2b256(IDP||Poseidon(IDC||UserID|

Address

Add a persistent randomizer: salt

Salt: A persistent peruser secret for unlinkability


How to hide the JWT? SNARKs to the rescue!

Goal: Prove you have a valid JWT + you know the salt + you injected the ephemeral key into JWT

- Verify JWT's signature using Google's public key
- Verify the ephemeral public key is injected into the JWT's nonce
- Verify that the address is derived correctly from the JWT's userID, walletID, providerID + user's salt

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Given a public IDP_pk and zkLogin address:	
I have access to a valid JWT under IDP_pk such that:	ł
zkLogin_add = Blake2b256(iss)Poseidon(aud)[sub]Poseidon(Salt))) &	ł
Signature on tnx details is valid under epk that is linked to JWT.	
•	<u> </u>

zkLogin in one slide: e2e



Who maintains the salt?


- Client-side on-device management
 - Edge cases, e.g., cross-device sync, device loss need handling
- Server-side management by a "salt service"
 - Each wallet can maintain their own service/delegate it
 - Privacy models: Store salt either in TEE/MPC/plaintext
 - Auth policies to the service: Either JWT or 2FA





Circuit details

- Implemented in Circom DSL: ~1M R1CS constraints
- We chose Groth16 due to its small proofs + rich ecosystem + fast prover
- Key operations
 - SHA-2 (66%)
 - RSA signature verification (14%) using tricks from [KPS18]
 - JSON parsing, Poseidon hashing, Base64, extra rules (20%)
- Prover based on rapidsnark
 - C++ and Assembly based



zkLogin latency

These numbers correspond only to the **first transaction of a session**

Salt service on AWS Nitro enclave (m5.xlarge10: 4 vCPUs, 16GB RAM)



ZKP generation on Google Cloud (n2d-standard-16: 16 vCPUs, 64GB RAM).

Operation	zkLogin	Ed25519
Fetch salt from salt service	0.2 s	NA
Fetch ZKP from ZK service	2.78 s	NA
Signature verification	2.04 ms	56.3 μs
E2E transaction confirmation	3.52 s	120.74 ms

Latency for most zkLogin transactions is **very similar** to traditional ones!


zkLogin trade-offs	Prover Service	Prover sees JWT; risks unlinkability between web2 and web3 identities.
	Time-consuming on most devices, but proofs can be cached.	Local Proof Generation
Is zkLogin really Non-Custodial?	App-Managed Salt	App can break unlinkability, posing potential risks.
The option of multi-sig option: Involve more IDPs instead	Users manage an additional secret, which is less sensitive than a mnemonic.	User-Managed Salt

zkLogin

single-click accounts w/




native authenticator non-custodial *discoverable, claimable invisible wallets semi-portable, 2FA




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JWT beyond zkLogin Some complementary ideas





JWT beyond zkLogin Some complementary ideas





Thank You!

Some of the slides done by Mysten labs team.