MAP OF ZK in 2024

Source: ZK Podcast

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

Soundness Labs

zkLogin: Onboarding the next billion users to web3

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Jointly with Foteini Baldimitsi | Kostas Chalkias | Yan Ji | Jonas Lindstrøm | Deepak Maram | Ben Riva | Arnab Roy | Joy Wang

To Appear at ACM CCS'24.

Presented at SBC'24.

There are around

100 million

active crypto wallets

and there are several

BILLIONS

of web2 accounts

Web3 has an onboarding problem



Web3 has an onboarding problem



Web3 has an onboarding problem



Web3 has an onboarding problem



Web3 has an onboarding problem



Mnemonics and keys are not going to get us mass adoption.

Complexity is the killer of adoption.
The ultimate killer dApp for blockchain, is accessibility.

Can we make it as easy as signing in with Google, Facebook and co?

- People don’t want to use separate passwords for each and every app, each and every web2 service
- Extremely likely they already have a Google, Facebook, Amazon account
- Solution: use OAuth to leverage these already existing accounts



zkLogin:
OAuth + Zero Knowledge Proof

Non-custodial
User-friendly
Privacy-preserving

OpenID Connect (an extension of OAuth 2.0)



JWT: JSON Web Token

Base64-encoded, RSA-signed

JWT as an alternative to a private key?



A Google-issued JWT (decoded)


```
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "kid": "96971808796829a972e79a9d1a9fff11cd61b1e3",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```


Sign in with Google


```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521            ",
  "nonce": "166379188139080602618705289039940387216697996138036016166781555121812732894 77",
  "iat": 1682002642,
  "exp": 1682006242,
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```


you can ask for email
and other personal info

zkLogin tricks

sample openID JWT token
signed by Google / FB

aud = walletID
sub = userID

we could ask for email too

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521                ",
  "nonce": "166379188139080602618705289039940387216697996138036016166781555121812732894 77",
  "iat": 1682002642,
  "exp": 1682006242,
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```

nonce = eph. pubKey + expiration

\+



\+ **ZK proof** =

ADDRESS
~hash(providerID + zkhash(walletID + userID + zkhash(salt)))

&

verify ZKproof

\+

verify eph key sig

Circuit details

- Implemented in circom: ~1M R1CS constraints
- Key operations
  - SHA-2 (66%)
  - RSA signature verification (14%) using tricks from [KPS18]
  - JSON parsing, Poseidon hashing, Base64, extra rules (20%)
- Prover based on rapidsnark



zkLogin latency

These numbers correspond only to the **first transaction of a session**

Operation	zkLogin	Ed25519
Fetch salt from salt service	0.2 s	NA
Fetch ZKP from ZK service	2.78 s	NA
Signature verification	2.04 ms	56.3 μs
E2E transaction confirmation	3.52 s	120.74 ms

Latency for most zkLogin transactions is **very similar** to traditional ones!

MystenLabs Sui COSIC Soundness Labs

Q & A

ZK for authentication

How to SNARK sign-in with Google, Apple & FB

Paper

Sui docs

Demo

Contact: mahdi@soundness.xyz

Slides credited to Mysten Labs crypto team.

Backup slides

Naive solution: OAuth + Custodian



Can we avoid the trusted custodian?

zkLogin goodies

Native auth, cheap

Not via smart contracts, same gas cost as regular sig verification.

ID-based wallets

Create email or phone number based accounts.

Can also reveal identity of an existing account (e.g., email) fully or partially (e.g., reveal a suffix like @xyz.edu)

Embedded wallet

Mobile apps or websites can natively integrate zkLogin without the need for a wallet popup!

2FA

Can do a 2-out-of-3 between Google, Facebook and Apple. Salt can also serve as a second factor.

Hard to lose!

Thanks to robust recovery paths of Google, Facebook.

ADDRESS

hash(providerID + zkhash(walletID + userID + zkhash(salt)))

+

ZK proof

zkLogin

single-click accounts w/

- Google
- Facebook
- Twitch
- Apple
- Slack
- Microsoft

native authenticator

non-custodial

*discoverable, claimable

invisible wallets

semi-portable, 2FA

Challenge 1: How to authorize a tx with a JWT?


```
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "kid": "969718087968 29a972e79a9d1a9fff11cd61b1e3",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521          ",
  "nonce": "166379188139080602618705289039940387216697996138036016166781555121812732894 77",
  "iat": 1682002642,
  "exp": 1682006242,
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```

Inject a fresh pub key into JWT!


```
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "kid": "96971808796829a972e79a9d1a9fff11cd61b1e3",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.ap                    ontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.a                    .googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521                ",
  "nonce": "166379188139080602618705289039940387216697996138036016166781555121812732894 77",
  "iat": 1682002642,
  "exp": 1682006242,
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```


replace ***nonce*** with user provided data:

ephemeral pub key + expiration

We have a DIGITAL CERT over our fresh key + expiration

Challenge 2: How to identify the user without linking identities?


```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521            ",
  "nonce": "166379188139080602618705289039940387216697996138036016166781555121812732894 77",
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}
```


aud = walletID
sub = userID

we could ask for email too

ADDRESS
???

Add a persistent randomizer: salt


```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521            ",
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  "iat": 1682002642,
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  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```


aud = walletID
sub = userID

we could ask for email too

ADDRESS

hash(providerID + walletID + userID + salt)

Salt: A persistent per-user secret for **unlinkability**

Who maintains the salt?

- Client-side on-device management
  - Edge cases, e.g., cross-device sync, device loss need handling

- Server-side management by a “salt service”
  - Each wallet can maintain their own service / delegate it
  - Privacy models: Store salt either in TEE / MPC / plaintext
  - Auth policies to the service: Either JWT or 2FA

ADDRESS

hash(providerID + walletID + userID + salt)

Salt: A persistent per-user secret for **unlinkability**

Challenge 3: How to hide the JWT? SNARKs to the rescue!

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
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}
```

aud = walletID
sub = userID

we could ask for email too

nonce = eph. pubKey + expiration

Goal: Prove you have a valid JWT + you know the salt + you injected the ephemeral key into JWT

- Verify JWT's signature using Google's public key
- Verify the ephemeral public key is injected into the JWT's nonce
- Verify that the address is derived correctly from the JWT's userID, walletID, providerID + user's salt

Yellow => private inputs
Blue => public inputs

Challenge 4: Prove + RTT in <3s

- We chose Groth16 due to its small proofs + rich ecosystem + fast prover
- But.. proofs are slow to generate on end-user devices
  - Make ZKP efficient: Hand-optimized circuit that selectively parses relevant parts of the JWT + string slicing tricks + …
  - Delegate proving to an untrusted ZKP service
    - Open problem: How to delegate with privacy?